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Is  there  a  scientific  revolution  taking  place  in  economics?  This  piece  seeks  to  apply  the  thinking  of
Wittgenstein and of the major philosopher of science who was, I have argued elsewhere.
26.1. Overview
Is there a scientific revolution taking place in economics? This piece seeks to apply the thinking of
Wittgenstein and of the major philosopher of science who was, I have argued elsewhere,  most influenced by
him—Kuhn—to the emergence of ‘ecological economics’. (This is a topic of not-inconsiderable importance,
given the power of economics in our world today, and the role of conventional economics in degrading the
Earth, a degrading which is now threatening to put not just myriads of other species but humanity itself ‘out
of business’.)
Due to the financial/economic crisis of the last decade, Economics itself ought to be in profound crisis and
rebirth. It does not seem to be, despite the apparent flux due to ‘behaviourial economics’ etc. But, at a slower
pace, there might be a paradigm-shift taking place in economics: the (slower, much deadlier) ecological crisis
seems gradually to be yielding a green or ecological economics.
This chapter will investigate what Wittgenstein’s philosophy has, implicitly, to say about this situation. Is the
fantasy of ‘progress’, as critiqued by Wittgenstein,  a key motivation for the dream of a scientific economics?
Is scientism, as also critiqued by Wittgenstein? I will (also) investigate what Kuhn’s (broadly
Wittgensteinian) philosophy has to say about this situation. Is economics the kind of thing that Kuhn
famously terms a ‘discipline without a paradigm’? Does it/could it have a scientific status? (Insofar as it does,
or could, does the emergence of ecological economics around Herman Daly et al. relevantly resemble (say)
the Chemical revolution around Lavoisier et al.?)
My conclusion is double: That, insofar as economics does or could have scientific status, then one might
justly say that the ecological economics revolution is or could be a real scientific revolution. But, and
superordinate to this point, that there remain significant (broadly Wittgensteinian and Kuhnian), probably
unovercomeable reasons to believe that it is misleading even to aspire to have a scientific economics—‘even’
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from within the standpoint of a scientifically-respectable ecology. Economics does not and probably never
will have scientific status. This means that attempts to ‘be scientific’ within economics are liable to be
pointless. Rather, we should seek to understand economics principally as something else, and something
needful and well worth having: especially, as politics and as philosophy, operating within the limits of
(natural) science (the limits imposed by ecology; i.e. by the Earth).
26.2. How to Make Economics into a Science…?
Economics, as Philip Mirowski has taught us, was ‘made’ into a ‘science’ by the crude expedient of directly
copying the paradigm of (the frontiers of) science in the mid-nineteenth century, mechanics. In the twentieth
century, there have been numerous efforts to ‘correct’ this model, to make it more scientific. Perhaps the most
impressive and plausible has been the effort by Robert Costanza to integrate economics with real science, in
particular with the environmental sciences—and in particular to value economically the biosphere. My
suggestion will be that, on balance, this move nevertheless points in precisely the wrong direction.
However, I will further suggest below that if we rotate the axis of our examination of economics, we can
come to see the contribution of Costanza et al. in a quite different light. In this light, it appears, not as a way
of making economics genuinely scientific at last, but as a way rather of showing economics to be what, I
contend, it really is or at least ought to be: a subset of Ecology and of Politics/Labour Studies (or—perhaps
better—simply a subset of ecology, human and non-human), a subset with in fact a peculiarly philosophical
face. This takes economics back to its roots in the great works of such economic philosophers as Marx,
Smith, the Physiocrats, and so on. Or even, as one might put it, before those roots: to political economy as a
craft, an art, and a way of thinking about life. On this understanding, we are beyond the idea of economics as
a science. Rather, economics gives way to environmental science and to political economy, and what insights
if any it offers ‘of its own’ become primarily non-quantitative, transitional, broadly philosophical insights.
(Just as, as we will see, Kuhn at his best would lead us to expect.)
For: it is an unjustly-neglected fact, and one of potentially-immense philosophical and political and
ultimately practical significance, that neo-classical economics originated, in the work of Jevons and Walras,
by means of an appropriation of nineteenth century physics. Specifically, that the creation of neoclassicism
involved the transformation of Helmholtzian energy-conservation principles into the ‘general equilibrium’
principles of the conservation of utility.  This creation of allegedly-scientific economics was accomplished in
remarkably direct fashion: the mechanics equations in question were kept intact, and what the variables stood
for was simply substituted, economic variables for physics variables. Thus economics seemingly attained the
legitimacy of a science: it mathematicised itself by presenting itself as a strict analogue for physics. The ‘laws
of economics’ were then supposed to apply just as rigorously to ‘social atoms’ as the laws of physics did to
physical atoms. At each stage in the growth of the economy, a new equilibrium was supposed to have been
attained: no limits were present, then, to the figures one could plug into these equations, representing now not
energy but utility.
AQ1
My own view, already argued elsewhere,  is that the self-identification of economics as a science has proven
disastrous to academic and intellectual inquiry, to the world, and (in the very long run) to economics itself.
My view, following Kuhn, would be in particular that the leap to numbers, to quantification, prior to a serious
effort qualitatively truly to understand the economic world, is deeply suspect. (And this is already a worrying
precedent for Costanzian ecological economics.)
Let me now explain this.
26.3. Social and Economic ‘Science’?
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Drawing extensively on Wittgenstein, I’ve argued over the years in a series of books  that the trouble with the
categories of ‘social/human/economic science’ is that they are an apeing of science. Acting as if you have a
paradigm in Kuhn’s sense, when you actually don’t.
The most common way in which this apeing occurs is through a numbers fetish. A premature effort to
quantify one’s discipline. With garbage in, and so garbage out….
Here is the opening of perhaps the most seminal of all Kuhn’s critiques of the urge to go forth and quantify:
“At the University of Chicago, the façade of the Social Science Research Building bears Lord Kelvin’s
famous dictum: “If you cannot measure, your knowledge is meager and unsatisfactory.” Would that statement
be there if it had been written, not by a physicist, but by a sociologist, political scientist, or economist? [I
suspect that] the answer to [this question] is no… Because physical science is so often seen as the paradigm
of sound knowledge and because quantitative techniques seem to provide an essential clue to its success, the
question how measurement has actually functioned for the past three centuries in physical science arouses
more than its natural and intrinsic interest. Let me therefore make my general position clear at the start. Both
as an ex-physicist and as an historian of physical science I feel sure that, for at least a century and a half,
quantitative methods have indeed been central to the development of the fields I study. On the other hand, I
feel equally convinced that our most prevalent notions both about the function of measurement and about the
source of its special efficacy are derived largely from myth.”
Kuhn goes on to suggest that the key to understanding why this is, and overcoming the myth that has long
had ‘social scientists’ in its thrall, is to understand that it is only if one achieves a new qualitative
understanding, of the kind arrived at when a scientific revolution occurs and institutes a new paradigm
(exemplar) at the heart of its fresh puzzle-solving normal scientific activity, that a quantitative understanding
can develop and be of any use. (A paradigm of this—to which we will return—was for Kuhn the Copernican
Revolution in astronomy. Copernicus gave us a new, perspective-revolutionising, simple qualitative
understanding of our place in the universe. His calculations by contrast were for a long time inferior to
Ptolemaic calculations (mainly because he assumed that the paths of the planets were circular, rather than
elliptical).)
The dread temptation that has lured economics down the path of scientism is of course that it has a ready-
made quantification to hand. Money preceded economics!
Economics typically aims at a scientificity that perpetually eludes it because it quantifies before it has arrived
at a fundamental qualitative understanding.
With regard then to economics and science, then, once one has admitted the stark almost uncontroversial
obviousness of economics’s scientific inefficacy to date (exemplified in the utter failure of mainstream
economics to predict the financial crisis, and in fact rather to facilitate it), two opposite options present
themselves:
(1) We could seek to make economics more scientific; genuinely scientific.
(2) We could admit that economics is not a science. That it is value-saturated, and needs to be
pluralistic, in ways that biology is not, even once we have (as we should) re-understood biology in
the kind of way recommended by John Dupre.
Now, I respect the impetus behind (1). And I am fully in favour, as I will explain, of making economics more
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compatible with science.
Moreover, I am 100% against the impression that might be given by (2) that there is nothing to be said for a
change of pre-analytic vision in economics. On the contrary, I believe that economics desperately needs the
new Earth-centred pre-analytic vision that Herman Daly has repeatedly proposed as a new foundation for
economics. That is the ecological economics ‘revolution’. But the question I am raising is whether that
revolution would genuinely be a scientific revolution in Kuhn’s sense. And whether the new Earth-centred
pre-analytic vision of planetary limits etc. should be considered therefore a paradigm. I am suspicious of that
idea, and a key aim of the present piece is to convey the reasons for that suspicion.
Wouldn’t it be simpler for me simply to urge that economics undergoes a Copernican revolution? One that
decentres humanity, as we were decentred from our place at the centre of the Universe by Copernicus.
Wouldn’t this be exactly the kind of qualitative improvement stressed by Kuhn? If, instead of the diagrams by
way of which students are introduced to economics, diagrams constructed around human needs, picturing an
endlessly expanding economy to which the ecosystem is a kind of externality or addendum (see e.g.
Figure 26.1), we moved to a richer picture which sees the ecosystem as the limit and encompasser of a much
‘smaller’ subsystem, the economy (see e.g. Figure 26.2):
Fig. 26.1
Sourced  from  Feasta  under  a  creative  commons  attribution-noncommercial-ShareAlike  3.0  unported
license
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Fig. 26.2
Sourced  from  Feasta  under  a  creative  commons  attribution-noncommercial-ShareAlike  3.0  unported
license
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AQ2
My reluctance to cave into the temptation to see the ecological economics ‘revolution’ as a scientific
revolution pure and simple—one which, like the Chemical Revolution did for chemistry, establishes
economics on the secure path of scientificity for the first time, by moving from Figs. 26.1 and 26.2,—can
only be fully understood once we go further into the hazards of the endeavor to arrive in the kind of way that
Costanza did at a quantitative ecological economics, and picture instead a way of seeing economics through
the lens of energy (the lens Costanza recommends) which we will be less tempted to regard scientistically.
26.4. Quantitative Ecological Economics?
The modelling of economics on mechanics, specifically on energy-conservation principles, a modelling
which has been of incalculable rhetorical significance and has had vast intellectual and real-world effects, as
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can be seen writ large in the works of such luminaries as Samuelson, and as exposed to the cold light of day
in the work Mirowski and others, can actually shed a good deal of light on the nature of ecological
economics.
The particular apeing of physics that we find in neoclassical economics has proven so effective (I mean in
terms of being adopted; I don’t mean scientifically effective) in part because it actually does key into one
deep similarity. Go back from the idea of utility to the idea of energy—and then an environmentally-centered
economics makes broad sense. There is a real sense—if one stretches the concept of energy as far as it can
possibly go (and so empties it of scientific content—see below)—in which the founding equations of
neoclassicism get something very important right. But only because what economics needs to understand—
and what neoclassicism systematically shields from view—is that it, economics, is (or rather, must be, ought
to be) nothing other than the study of all the producers of or vehicles of energy, in the broadest sense of that
word: encompassing for instance not only fossil fuel energy and renewable energy, but also the energy
provided by the labour of animals, including crucially of course the labour of probably the most vital
economic animal of all, humankind. That is, of energy (in the ordinary sense of the word) and ecology (i.e.
both the finitude of non-renewable energy and the finitude of Earth’s natural resources and of the capacity of
the Earth to absorb pollution), and of the ‘energy’-contributions of human and non-human-animal actors and
of technological change. And so on.
This would of course require a complete revolution in the practice of economics.
Is what I am saying this: That if economics were to take seriously the origins of the equations which birthed
neoclassicism, then, maybe it might be scientific after all? Possibly: But I think not quite. For what would it
be? It’s environmental science (and perhaps ‘ecological economics’—see below) which take seriously the
study of energy sources and the hazards attending their mass use: economics would then in effect be a
human- and societally- oriented branch of a widened environmental science, and would be exposed to the
limits which the latter centres (or ought to centre) its investigations on. I.e. The planetary limits (and social
limits to growth, and so forth). It would no longer be able to hold out the mad prospect of indefinitely-
prolonged ‘growth’; it would have to give up the equations which founded it altogether except insofar as they
were radically reconceived to include all that had been previously excluded as mere ‘externalities’. And this
inclusion would have to be done not in monetary terms, but in terms of the manifold of energy, impact,
sustainability, and so on. I.e. It would be economics that was subsumed into ecology, not vice versa.
The way that the economic valuation of nature has proceeded (in Costanza and his many successors in
‘natural capital’ valuation) has been to try to assimilate nature to (economic) capital, rather than vice versa.
This, I am suggesting, is very troubling.
Furthermore: economics which took seriously that it is about labour and the use of animals and so on too
would have to recognise not only their limits but also their sufferings and tragedies (and joys etc.). It would
be open to the downsides for its ‘objects’ of for instance growth—such as, perhaps, greater stress, greater
exploitation, less free time, more sickness. It would have to consider the problematic consequences of
increasing ‘use of human (or other animal) energy’. For, rather than abstracting from these, as one does when
one simply assumes that utility is growing as the economy grows, it would have to look and see whether that
was in fact the case. (The Index of Sustainable Welfare, the Genuine Progress Indicator etc. are perhaps a first
tentative step in this direction. But even these, we should be suspicious of. We should be deeply suspicious of
any effort, however well-intentioned, however ‘complete’, however ‘scientific’, that seeks to reduce the
entire economy, let alone the broader society, with all its incommensurables, to one number.)
What this all amounts to is that, from the point of view for instance of labour or of ecosystems—and actually
these combine, in the concept of ecology as including human ecology —we don’t have (as of course we do in8
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physics) a conservation of energy, except in the exceptional (desirable) case when we practice (human)
ecology in the normative sense of the word, behaving with ecosystemic rectitude and treat people aright, etc.
When for instance we use almost exclusively genuinely renewable energy, rather than fossil fuels or nuclear
(for the latter, just like fossil fuels, is non-renewable (depending on finite fuel sources) and dangerously
polluting); and when we don’t abuse labour or animals. We might then put the point this way: for (post-neo-
classical) economics to really be true, it would have to become the study of and respect for labour (and, as
Polanyi reminded us in his great work The great transformation, labourers are also of course actually
citizens, people) and for the entirety of our ecosystems. Economics must decisively lose its absurd sense of
itself as (the study of) a Pareto-optimal pseudo-closed system. A closed circuit of exchange of goods and
services. For it is completely open to (the implications of) the finitude of our world—and all that is in it.
When we construe labour as energy, for instance, then, as implied above, its increase does not yet register as
the cost it probably is to the quality of life of the labourer(s). When we construe fossil fuel energy only as
energy, too, its increased use does not register as the cost it certainly is to future generations. The physical
universe (though not the Earth, because of the Sun), from whence the conservation principles came, is
(roughly) a closed system. For the economic system to characterize itself similarly is for it to ignore its
through-and-through embeddedness in and co-constitutiveness with the environment—with the entire
planetary ecosystem—which only works effectively as a semi-closed system open to the flow of solar energy
when it is both lucky and is run well by its denizens/citizens. ‘Run well’, in the sense not necessarily (or
rather: almost necessarily not) of the logic of actually-existing neoclassical economics, nor even of any
souped-up quantitatively-improved version of it, but rather in the far subtler and wider and still-less
measurable logic of the happiness and integrity in inter-relatedness of the creatures of the world, including of
future generations. For if we think of the world as a finite whole, as ecosystemic thinking—but not of course
neoclassical economic thinking—demands, then included in that whole are all the generations as yet unborn,
too….
When one thinks through then what it would take to be able to take seriously an understanding of economics
as potentially involving a kind of conservation of ‘energy’, one sees that it will among other things involve
recapturing lost greatness in the economics that came before the triumph of neoclassicism. For example, a
return to what insights were present in ‘the labour theory of value’ (which reached its apogee in Marx ) and
in land theories of value (e.g. the forgotten work of the Physiocrats). But it is not, I submit, a theory of value
that we really require, not even one which intelligently ‘combines’ the (value of and in the) labour of humans
and animals, the energy extracted from the Earth in fuel-form, and so on, into an ecological synthesis.
To see why I say this, it is worth looking further at some of the most important work done by the influential
founding ‘ecological’ economist: Costanza. Costanza tried in 1980 to develop an ‘energetic’ theory of value.
That is, he tried to convert not only natural resources but also labour and even government services into
energy equivalents (Here we see why any assumption that total literal quantification of energy in the
economic sense might be possible by commensurating it as in for example the old concept/unit of ‘house
power’ would be in vain). He claimed that his results showed that inputs of energy values are extremely
closely correlated to outputs of monetary values.
One way this effort might be seen is as an (extremely-valuable and much-needed?) effort to internalize the
ecosystem, labour etc. into economics… But is that actually what is needed? Or should things rather, as I
intimated above, move the other way: should economics be subsumed into the study and understanding of
ecology, of labour, and indeed of political understanding and action?
Of course, Costanza’s work that attempted to reduce everything to energy should be distinguished from his
even more famous work that attempted to reduce everything to money, to price the ‘natural capital’ of the
entire world. But he is hardly in a good place from which to object to a way that I may seem here to have run
these two things together; because, as just outlined, he tends to run them together, himself!
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26.5. On the Roots of the Dangerous Delusion of Measuring
‘Natural Capital’
Is Costanza’s analysis an alternative to neoclassicism, showing up its limitations or blindspots? Or is it a
correction to it; does it merely put neoclassicism right where it had gone a little wrong? Or is it even the
bringing of neoclassicism to full self-consciousness? Is Costanza’s achievement actually to show what it
would be to take seriously the founding intuition of neoclassicism—that economic activity IS energy—,
while retaining neoclassical pricing methodology and the concept of equilibrium?
My own suspicion is that the latter is very close to being the truth. I think that Costanza’s ‘energetic’ theory
of value is precisely of a piece with his pricings of the atmosphere, of the sea, of the entire ecosystem of our
planet. His ‘Promethean’ would-be valuation of the totality of natural capital. I regard the latter as an obscene
triumph of the logic of neoclassical economics, not as any kind of alternative to it.  It seems to me that
ecological economics has yet to decide whether it is really ready to put ecology and human life first, or
whether it is merely a kind of adjunct to—in fact, a completer of, a more efficient and grander, more total
version of—neoclassicism.
In a way, then, Costanza is deepening our difficulties, not solving them. He inappropriately tries to make
economics more scientific, by including factors that it has excluded.
The effort to price ‘natural capital’ (or ‘ecosystem services’) in effect contends that we can scientifically
analyse the entire planetary ecosystem and convert it into money. That the category of capital is superordinate
to the category of nature. That money is more important than life. This is a bizarre destiny for what was
meant to be an ecological economics.
But, if Costanza saw what he was wanting to do in the alternative philosophical light that I am developing
here, he would see that there is another possible way of following up the ‘energetic’ insight with which he
began. For when one takes seriously the sense in which energy (in a broad enough sense of the word) just is
identical with economic activity, without attempting to theorize or scientise this insight, then one sees that
actually one’s insight is not and could not be best characterised as a piece of science nor even theory. It is
rather ‘just’ a way of seeing—a ‘point of view’ —a perspicuous, helpful and insightful more or less
philosophical (in Wittgenstein’s sense) way of recovering a way of seeing that economic ideology can get in
the way of. Of course economic activity is ((describable/readable as) meetings of and various forms of)
energy—one might even justly wonder what else it could possibly be? And now one will be much more
able—better primed—to look at what counts so much for us, at this point in history—the impact of these
employments of energy, upon our quality of life, upon the liveability of the planet for future generations, and
so on. The things which neoclassicism has little or no conceptual space for. Which it treats, ludicrously as
‘externalities’. Bringing those ‘externalities’ inside a system that is set up fundamentally on the wrong basis
is not progress, it is the making seemingly coherent of something monstrous.
It won’t make sense to do what Costanza wanted to do: literally to quantify these things. (The wide bringing
together under the heading of ‘energy’ that I’ve briefly and speculatively carried out is not a
commensuration, let alone a mensuration, let alone the basis of a quantification. Because life is
incommensurate with non-life, for starters.) But that’s just as well: for that attempt at quantification was
pretty absurd or just repellent to begin with. To quantify the value of what sustains life is as nonsensical as it
is abominable: infinite value is of an altogether different order to finite (genuinely quantifiable/measurable)
value; infinity is not a number. Likewise: Costanza’s ‘result’ that inputs of energy value are closely tied to
outputs of monetary value is a fake piece of (pseudo-)’science’: for when everything is reduced to energy, of
course there is a virtually constant relationship between energy and output! The contribution to growth of
labour, government etc. is computed by reference to the output—so there is only a fake appearance of
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something having been explained here.  Costanza’s famous pricing of the world’s ecosystem services is in
this way based in a dangerous piece of metaphysical pseudo-science. Because it is only the illusion that we
can assimilate everything natural into one thing whether that be energy or money, that enables his pricing to
seem possible.
Economic activity ‘is’ energy: but this is not a basis for any kind of science, but only a reminder of
something —or, rather, of a whole lot of things—that only a scientistic ideology could have caused us to
forget, in the first place. Value can’t truly be theorized—this deep truth, Costanza doesn’t seem to have
realized, any more than Marx did. But their ideas have the germ in them of profound philosophic reminders
to us.  Being reminded of the ineradicable contributions of labour, of (now in the ordinary sense) energy,
etc., to the economy is a portion of the study of—and the realization of—who we are, what we really want
and need etc.; with us (humans) understood as utterly embedded in and co-constitutive with nature.
Where do otherwise promising ‘ecological economists/philosophers’ such as John Gowdy  and Robert
Costanza most deeply go wrong? In hoping for quantifications of the value of nature and/or scientific
appraisals or theorizations of its value. For these hopes embody incoherent goals. Science cannot tell us
anything about nature’s value. (And attempts to quantify it will always underestimate nature’s value for
unknowably-distant future generations, who are typically ‘discounted’ to some extent in the calculations even
of ecological economists. A true steady-state economics is needed. With—contra Costanza’s famous,
catastrophic allowance of a discount rate of approx. 2% p.a. —no discounting.)
When we think of economic activity/growth etc. as essentially dependent upon energy in the expanded sense
of that term which I outlined above, then it doesn’t mean anything any more to characterise that concept,
“energy”, as the focus of a science. Far from it. The concept of “energy” no longer has quantifiable content: it
cannot be measured as Costanza wished to measured it, nor used in equations as standard neoclassicism wish
in effect to use it (to ‘index’ utility or its positivistic successor-concepts). It is conceptually unmeasurable. It
is empty, from the point of view of any self-respecting science. Rather, what we have in our hands, in this
expanded concept of “energy”, is the focus of—the nub of—a philosophical insight. That returns us to the
land, to labour, and so on. To this world, where we find the real—and perilously open-systemed—economy.
An economy that is a subset of society, and that depends on societal (and ultimately, on philosophical)
valuation.
We have seen then that economics was made into a ‘science’ by the crude expedient of directly copying the
paradigm of (the frontiers of) science in the mid-nineteenth century, mechanics. This copying was well-
contested by real scientists at the time, but to no avail.  Nor was it of any avail when physics moved on, as it
swiftly did—e.g. the Second Law of thermodynamics, letalone quantum mechanics, have seemingly barely
been noticed by the ‘scientific’ economists who have utterly dominated their discipline, to date. In the
twentieth century, various efforts from within economics to contest this ‘scientific’ model have been fought
in the trenches, or co-opted, (or arguably both, in the important case for instance of Keynes). There have also
been very numerous efforts to correct the model, to make it more scientific. One of the most interesting of
recent times has been the influential effort by Robert Costanza et al. to integrate economics with real science,
in particular with ecology and the environmental sciences in general. My suggestion above however is that
this move, at least as it has been attempted thus far, points in precisely the wrong direction. No effort to save
the scientific status of economics which does not entirely give up the starting point of neoclassicism will have
any lasting effect, and such efforts, especially if intelligently carried out, with attention to what does indeed
need to be attended to (e.g. the ecological crisis), are merely particularly-dangerous obscurers of this truth.
Such is my assessment of the ‘movement’ for economic valuation of natural capital and ecosystem services.
However, I suggested also that if we rotate the axis of our examination of economics, we can come to see the
contribution of Costanza in a quite different light. In this light, it appears, not as a way of making economics
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genuinely scientific at last, but as a way rather of showing economics to be what, I contend, it really is or at
least ought to be: a subset of Ecology and of Politics/Labour Studies (or—better—simply a subset of ecology,
human and non-human) a subset with in fact a peculiarly philosophical face. This takes economics back to its
roots, in the great works of such moral philosophers as Marx, Smith, the Physiocrats, and so on. On this
understanding, we are beyond the idea of economics as a science. Economics must be compatible with
science; and at present it is not. But if we try to make it into a science, we end up with the absurdities of
Costanzianism. I’ve suggested that the way out of those absurdities lies via philosophical rethinking in a
broadly Wittgensteinian mold.
Rather than itself becoming a science, then, the optimum solution is for economics as we currently know it to
give way to environmental science and to political economy, and what insights it offers ‘of its own’ become
chiefly non-quantitative, transitional, philosophical insights: like the insight, which is really just a way of
reminding ourselves of what is so obvious, so constantly in view, that we are inclined to look through it and
forget it,  that there can be no economic activity without one kind or another of ‘energy’, and a fortiori that
economic growth tends of course to requires an increase in such ‘energy’. And then the only truth in
neoclassicism is this, seen through a glass darkly. The equations that neoclassicism borrowed from physics
then become bearers of insight after all: but they point precisely, now, not to economics as a free-standing
science, but quite beyond this idea. They point, in fact, to the absurdity of the growthist hegemony and to the
beginnings of an alternative: to the world that we all always already know (so long as ideology doesn’t
delude us about it); to the improvement of our knowledge that comes from real, natural science (especially,
ecology); and to philosophical understanding itself. Understanding of the kind essayed, for example, in the
present chapter. And thus to the possibility of us deciding together what kind of economy to have, within the
limits that nature sets for us.
26.6. Wittgensteinian Conclusions
As I understand him,  Wittgenstein is above all a philosopher of intellectual freedom. He teaches us that our
thinking is constantly constrained by the scribblings of dead philosophers, and that, to escape such influences,
we have to make them conscious. Once we do so, as I have sought to do in this piece, then we can choose our
path adequately at last.
I propose that we exercise our philosophical freedom not by creating new theoretical edifices—such as a
genuine science of economics would supposedly be—but by taking the bold step of actually making explicit
and then questioning the hegemony of science (i.e. the step of questioning scientism).
We saw in this chapter that there are two rival visions of ecological economics available:
(1) On the Costanzian vision, we seek to internalize externalities in full. This is the most superficially
obvious way for a Kuhnian to go, in relation to economics. It would be exemplified by Costanza’s
famous valuation of the total value of the world’s ‘ecosystem services’.
(2) If, by contrast, we take Herman Daly’s vision of ecological economics, as based in a quite distinct
pre-analytic vision, seriously, and truly place Earth (and the Sun!) at the centre of our thinking,
while recognizing that Earth has simultaneously to be thought as far more than a rock—i.e.
recognizing that the reason the Earth matters is because of the beings (not just humans!) inhabiting
it—then a different philosophical path opens up before us. One leaving intact the sociality and
politicality of economics. And constraining economics tightly by way of natural science, and
particularly of ecology (which, as Teddy Goldsmith labored to show us,  is actually far more than a
natural science!). This is a subtler way to think Kuhn in relation to economics, a way not presuming
that economics ‘really is’ a science. And rather, taking inspiration from Kuhn’s legitimation of many
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ways of knowing that are non-scientific.
Route (1), I have suggested, fails, for Kuhnian reasons: because there is an inadequate qualitative
understanding of the world, in the ‘paradigm’ of neoclassical economics; and all that Costanza ultimately
does is to seek to correct that paradigm. Not to transcend it.
The terrible irony of the neoclassical system of economics is that if models its subject metaphorically on the
conservation of energy but ignores the literal truth of the laws of thermodynamics. Entropy is a fatality for
endless growth. Costanza tries to correct this failing. But it would be better to junk the whole failed vision.
Substituting a better one; but without leaping to the conclusion that this better green ecological vision of
economics is a vision literally of a science.
26.7. Envoi: A Policy-Alternative to the Scientism of ‘Natural
Capital’ and ‘Ecosystem Services’?
What, then, is the alternative to a fake scientisation of economics? If the now-widely-influential Costanza-
inspired idea of measuring the economic value of ‘ecosystem services’ is based in pseudo-science, and ought
to be replaced by a deeper effort to politically and ecologically philosophise a world that could last, what
form should the latter effort take?
That is a task for another paper. But let me make one concrete proposal. One of the gravest dangers of the
economic valuation of natural capital or ecosystem services is that it encourages us to think that we now
know the value of any ‘chunk’ (sic) of nature. In relation to ‘natural capital’, a precautionary approach by
contrast clarifies that it is reckless ever to assume that the purported worth in monetary terms of some chunk
of nature/farmland actually exhausts its worth. Rather, we should always err on the side of thinking that there
is likely to be much that is valuable that is not yet evident or understood by us. Consider in this context
biodiversity loss. Conservation biologists and ecologists agree the rate of species loss is at least 100 and
possibly 1000 times faster than background—the fastest mass extinction in the history of the world. But, as
the wide margin of uncertainty in the previous sentence reveals, there is so much we do not yet know about
the process. Meanwhile, biologists estimate that we may be aware as yet of as few as 1 in 10 species that
exist in the world ; a far far higher level of ignorance than is present in other sciences such as chemistry.
Any financial estimation of the value of biodiversity thus risks direly and systematically understating what is
at risk of being lost. The Precautionary Principle would, rightly, force us to lean far more toward safety.
Our vast ignorance of ecology and biology is a serious limit even upon any serious effort to turn economics
into science by integrating it with ecology and biology. Given that context, a far better basis for guarding
nature at this fateful moment in human history than the fashionable fad for financialisation of nature would
be: a serious entrenchment of the Precautionary Principle. And this would bring with it a concomitant great
advantage: that precaution simultaneously warns against the reckless pursuit of economic growth. For of
course it is still in reality, economic-growthism, and not environmentalism, that actually motivationally
underlies most of the dangerous drive toward the economic valuation of so-called ‘ecosystem services’.
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